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Models of the macroeconomy have gotten quite sophisticated, thanks to decades of development and advances in 
computing power. Such models have also become indispensable tools for monetary policymakers, useful both for fore-
casting and comparing different policy options. Their failure to predict the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis does not negate their 
usefulness, it only points to some areas that can be improved.
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“All models are false but some are useful” 
—George Box
Periods of economic and social crisis can easily turn into pe-
riods of change for economics as a profession. The dramatic 
ﬁ  nancial crisis we experienced recently has caused econo-
mists to question the prevailing assumptions and standard 
approaches of the ﬁ  eld. It is not the ﬁ  rst time—the problems 
of the 1970s and 1930s had a similar effect on economic 
theory—and it surely will not be the last. 
As we come to terms with why the crisis happened and why 
economists could not prevent or predict it, it is important 
to understand what was wrong with mainstream doctrine 
and practice. It is likewise just as important to identify what 
was working ﬁ  ne. As the old saying goes, let’s not throw the 
baby out with the bath water. 
In this Commentary, we focus on one subset of economic theory 
and practice, the role of econometric models in the conduct 
of monetary policy. We review the development of different 
types of models commonly in use and highlight their success-
es and failures since the 1950s. In doing so, we also describe 
some of the common approaches that central banks use for 
forecasting and evaluating different policy scenarios.
Forecasting and Monetary Policy
Forecasting plays a vital role in the conduct of monetary 
policy. Policymakers need to predict the future direction of 
the economy before they can decide which policy to adopt. 
While, strictly speaking, they do not necessarily need an 
economic model to discuss where the economy is heading, 
the use of a model’s forecast has the beneﬁ  t of elevating that 
discussion to a scientiﬁ  c and systematic level. Models can be 
used to test different theories, for example, and they require 
forecasters to clearly spell out their underlying hypotheses.
But policymakers need forecasting tools that do more than 
project the likely path of important economic indicators like 
inﬂ  ation, output, or unemployment. They need tools that 
can provide them with policy guidance—tools that help them 
determine the economic implications of monetary-policy 
changes. For example, what will the economy look like un-
der the original monetary policy, and what will it look like 
after the change? For this reason, there has been an effort 
over the past 40 to 50 years to develop empirical forecast-
ing models that are able to provide policymakers with this 
kind of guidance. Three broad categories of macroeconomic 
models have arisen during this time, each with its own 
strengths and weaknesses: structural, nonstructural, and 
large-scale models. 
Structural models are built using the fundamental principles 
of economic theory, often at the expense of the model’s abili-
ty to predict key macroeconomic variables like GDP, prices, 
or employment. In other words, economists who build struc-
tural models believe that they learn more about economic 
processes from exploring the intricacies of economic theory 
than from closely matching incoming data. Nonstructural models are primarily statistical time-series 
models—that is, they represent correlations of historical 
data. They incorporate very little economic structure, and 
this fact gives them enough ﬂ  exibility to capture the force 
of history in the forecasts they generate. They intentionally 
“fudge” theory in an effort to more closely match economic 
data. The lack of economic structure makes them less useful 
in terms of interpreting the forecast, but at the same time, 
it makes them valuable in producing unconditional fore-
casts. That means that they generate the expected future 
paths of economic variables without imposing a path on 
any particular variable. These unconditional forecasts are 
typically accurate if the overall monetary policy regime does 
not change. Since policy regimes change infrequently, most 
forecasts from nonstructural models are useful. 
The third category, large-scale models, is a kind of middle 
ground between the structural and nonstructural mod-
els. Such models are a hybrid; they are like nonstructural 
models in that they are built from many equations which 
describe relationships derived from empirical data. They are 
like structural models in that they also use economic theory, 
namely to limit the complexity of the equations. They are 
large, and their size brings pros and cons. One advantage 
is that relationships can be selected from a huge variety of 
data series, making it possible to provide a thorough de-
scription of the economic condition of interest. For instance, 
structural models rarely feature variables such as “car sales,” 
while large-scale models often do. The main disadvantage 
is their complexity, which poses some limitations to their 
understanding and use. 
Big Models Take Shape
The interest in developing large-scale forecasting models for 
policy purposes began in the 1960s at a time when Keynes-
ian economic theory was very popular and advances in 
computer technology made their use feasible. Toward the 
end of the decade, the Federal Reserve Board developed its 
ﬁ  rst version of a macro model for the U.S. economy called 
MPS (MIT, University of Pennsylvania, and Social Science 
Research Council). The Board began to use the model for 
forecasting and policy analysis in 1970. In the initial version, 
MPS contained about 60 behavioral equations (equations 
that describe the behavior of economic variables). At the 
time, economists thought they had built a structural model. 
Soon they would ﬁ  nd otherwise.
The initial optimism and momentum for building practical 
economic models was abruptly interrupted in the 1970s, a 
decade of great inﬂ  ation and macroeconomic turbulence. 
The failure of economists to forecast high inﬂ  ation and 
unemployment and to successfully address the economic 
troubles of the period produced a loss of faith in mainstream 
Keynesian theory and in the models that were the operative 
arm of that theory. 
Disappointment came from realizing that the models that had 
been developed were not as structural as previously thought. 
Several ﬂ  aws were identiﬁ  ed, including assumptions about the 
behavior of prices and the overall modeling approach. 
The models’ greatest weakness was that they ignored the 
role that expectations play in inﬂ  uencing future economic 
events. The Fed’s and other large-scale models were often 
used for conditional forecasting exercises, in which vari-
ables of interest are forecasted for a chosen monetary policy 
stance. Comparing scenarios shows the economic implica-
tions of different monetary policy stances. But since the 
models did not incorporate expectations, in particular about 
monetary and ﬁ  scal policies, they did not produce reliable 
conditional forecasts. 
These weaknesses were clearly a drawback when turbulence 
hit the economy. In fact, when people are making decisions 
in periods of high uncertainty, they put a lot of emphasis on 
anticipating what policymakers will do. They can behave 
differently than they did in the past, which policymakers 
won’t be able to predict if they’re relying on models that 
merely capture historical behavior patterns and don’t incor-
porate expectations. 
The Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas was one of the ﬁ  rst 
economists to point out the pitfalls of underplaying the role 
of expectations, especially in relation to policy recommenda-
tions. He pointed out that the underlying parameters of the 
prevailing models—the numerical constants embedded in 
the models that drove the forecasts—were not constant at all. 
They would change as policy changed or as expectations 
about policy changed, leaving policy conclusions based on 
these models completely unreliable. (The argument came 
to be called the Lucas critique.) The policy failures of the 
1970s seemed to bear him out. Lucas called for models with 
deeper theoretical structures, and the economics profession 
heard him.
Development led next in two directions, one toward improv-
ing the existing large-scale models and the other toward 
further developing nonstructural forecasting models. The 
latter effort has led to the widespread use and success of 
vector auto-regression models (VARs). 
The Fed continued to work on its large-scale models. It de-
veloped a multicountry model (MCM) to complement the 
MPS, and in the 1990s it developed a new set of models—
FRB/US, FRB/MCM, and FRB/World. These new models 
still kept most of the underlying structural framework and 
the equilibrium relationships of the MPS and the MCM, 
but they also contained explicit speciﬁ  cations of forward-
looking expectations and a more sophisticated representa-
tion of agents’ decision making. Though they are not truly 
structural, they are still nevertheless the prime large-scale 
macro models (with over 250 behavioral equations) cur-
rently in use at the Fed. FRB/US is the most comprehensive 
model of the U.S. economy available anywhere.The Dawn of DSGE Models
The rational expectations revolution of the 1970s created a 
temporary disconnect between academia and central banks. 
Economists at universities started working on developing a 
modeling framework that did not violate the Lucas critique. 
Monetary policymakers meanwhile continued to work 
with existing large-scale models since they were the only 
available framework for policy analysis. At the same time, 
they worked on improving those models by incorporating 
features advocated by Lucas and others, such as forward-
looking expectations. 
In a curious twist of fate, the disconnect was resolved by 
the rise of a new set of models, commonly known as DSGE 
(dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) models. The roots 
of DSGE models can be traced back to real business cycle 
theory—a theory that left very little room for monetary 
policy actions. 
Harvard’s Gregory Mankiw explains what DSGE models 
are in his popular textbook. Paraphrasing, dynamic means 
the models “trace the path of variables over time” (since 
the decisions of households and businesses affect not only 
the current period but future periods as well); stochastic 
means the models incorporate techniques that account for 
the possibility of random economic events; and general equi-
librium means that each model is built as a whole system 
and everything within the system depends on everything 
else (prices determine what people do, but what people do 
also determines prices). 
Research on DSGE models has been going on at a signiﬁ  -
cant pace since the 1980s, but only in the past few years 
have the models been used seriously for forecasting. While 
similar to large-scale models, DSGE models are different 
in that the latter have better microeconomic foundations: 
Household and ﬁ  rm behavior is modeled from ﬁ  rst prin-
ciples, while equations that relate macroeconomic variables 
(such as output, consumption, and investment) to each 
other are determined from the aggregation of the micro-
economic equations. 
The aggregation follows a strict bottom-up approach that 
goes from the micro to the macro level. This approach 
makes DSGE models better-suited to constructing condi-
tional forecasts and comparing different policy scenarios.
DSGE models have a number of other advantages over 
large-scale models. They avoid the expectations problem 
that Lucas alerted everyone to. They incorporate a role for 
monetary policy, making them appealing to central banks. 
And ﬁ  nally, a technical advantage is that they can make 
use of the powerful solution methods of nonstructural 
models, given that their decision rules are usually well ap-
proximated by linear rules. The economist Francis Diebold 
described this aspect of DSGE models as “a marvelous 
union of modern macroeconomic theory and nonstructural 
times-series econometrics.”
Model Shortfalls and the Future
Since DSGE models are technically very difﬁ  cult to solve 
and analyze, they are much smaller in scale—usually fea-
turing less than a hundred variables. They cannot easily 
incorporate the large array of high-frequency data usually 
available to policymakers. 
Unfortunately, leaving some variables out may often lead 
to serious misspeciﬁ  cation. For this reason, Princeton 
economist Christopher Sims characterizes DSGE models as 
useful story-telling devices that cannot yet replace large-scale 
models for forecasting purposes. On the other hand, Ben 
Bernanke, chairman of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, noted that DSGE models are “increas-
ingly useful for policy analysis” and “likely to play a more 
signiﬁ  cant role in the forecasting process over time….” 
Economic forecasting models have come a long way since 
the 1970s, both the structural and nonstructural varieties. 
Most models, however, failed to predict the recent ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. This failure may be partly attributed to the models’ 
failure to fully incorporate the growing role of the ﬁ  nancial 
sector or the worldwide ﬁ  nancial and trade linkages that glo-
balization has generated. 
However, while the economics profession is currently trying 
to address those deﬁ  ciencies, there is something intrinsic to 
economics that makes forecasting difﬁ  cult. Contrary to the 
natural sciences, the social sciences do not have true invari-
ants that can be used as scientiﬁ  c foundations. There is 
nothing like a “constant of gravity” in economics, which we 
can claim is really constant. This happens because the object 
that is studied and the observer are in continuous interac-
tion, and those sorts of relationships have no easily predict-
able consequences. 
It is unlikely that models will ever provide perfectly accurate 
forecasts. That is because forecasts are ultimately just an-
other variable in the system, and it is impossible to restrain 
them from inﬂ  uencing other variables in the system. Once 
a forecast is revealed, the forecast itself can actually change 
people’s behavior. In fact, the people who attend most closely 
to forecasts are the people whose behavior is most likely to 
affect the future course of the variables forecasted. In the 
end, while policymakers would prefer better forecasts, poli-
cymakers’ ultimate objective is better policy. And the lack of 
forecasting ability does not prevent models from being useful 
devices that can help policymakers in making decisions. 
In this respect, the contribution that DSGE models have 
provided is mainly methodological, making them a useful 
complement to, but not a substitute for, large-scale macro-
economic models or nonstructural VARs. At the same time, 
they have given academic economists and central bank staff 
a base for a common language. In this respect, we believe 
DSGE models have had a success that cannot be judged by 
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